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I. INTRODUCTION
You cannot avoid them.  They are everywhere:  attorney 
advertisements.  You see them on television, billboards, buses, 
benches, magazines, newspapers, and even urinals in bars.1  If you go 
online, you arguably see them even more with a dizzying array of 
marketing, branding, and other promotions.  Many also engage in 
crazy and zany videos.2  They show wreck videos, play Christmas 
jingles, employ talking dolls, resemble soap operas, or depict lawyers 
as superheroes.3  Some attorneys use sexually provocative ads.4  Some 
certainly can push the boundaries of good taste.5  The nicknames some 
of these lawyers inspire interest or at least laughter.  To name a few, 
1. Stacy Barchenger, Lawyer Banks on “DUI Dick” Name to Find Clients,
THE TENNESSEAN, https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2014/12/30/lawyer-
banks-dui-dick-name-find-clients/21062843/ (last updated Jan. 1, 2015, 8:18 PM) 
(describing a now-deceased attorney, V. Michael Fox, who had his ads placed above 
urinals in various bars in Middle Tennessee).  Several years earlier, a state lawmaker 
introduced a bill in the Tennessee legislature to limit DUI lawyer ads.  See Erik 
Schelzig, Senate Measure Would Ban Lawyers from DUI Advertising, MEMPHIS
DAILY NEWS (Apr. 24, 2008), 
https://www.memphisdailynews.com/news/2008/apr/24/senate-measure-would-ban-
lawyers-from-dui-advertising/. 
2. See, e.g., Kylie Madry, Fort Worth’s “Texas Law Hawk” Blows Up the
Internet in Firework-Fueled Commercial, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (July 6, 2017), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/fort-worth/2017/07/06/fort-worths-texas-law-
hawk-blows-internet-firework-fueled-commercial (describing a lawyer commercial 
in which the lawyer set off fireworks that he had tied to himself). 
3. Supreme Court Won’t Restrain Lawyer Ads, MOBILE PRESS-REGISTER,
Mar. 3, 2009, at B3; Joseph Goldstein, Superhero Lawyer Ads Are Ruled Fit for TV, 
N.Y. SUN (July 24, 2007), https://www.nysun.com/new-york/superhero-lawyer-ads-
are-ruled-fit-for-tv/58989/. 
4. See generally Steven A. Delchin & Sean P. Costello, Show Me Your
Wares: The Use of Sexually Provocative Ads to Attract Clients, 30 SETON HALL L.
REV. 64 (1999) (analyzing the ethics of lawyers’ uses of sexually themed 
advertisements to attract clients). 
5. Anna Massoglia, Lawyer Videos That Push the Boundaries of Dignity and
Good Taste, LAWYERIST.COM (Nov. 25, 2016), https://lawyerist.com/attorney-ads-
that-pushed-the-bar/. 
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there are “the Alabama Hammer,”6 “the Texas Law Hawk,”7 and “DUI 
Dick.”8 
It is not about laughs but serious dollars.  Some lawyers 
contribute literally millions of dollars to increase their brand through 
phone numbers, domain names, and other venues.9  For example, an 
enterprising California-based attorney has spent millions marketing his 
brand “No Cuffs.”10  A New Orleans-based attorney spends $1 million 
per month in television advertising.11  In 2015, personal injury 
attorneys spent more than $892 million.12  A year later, the total was 
close to $1 billion.13  Attorney advertising has become more than 
ubiquitous in modern America. 
This Essay addresses the phenomenon of attorney advertising 
from several vantage points.  Part II of the Essay addresses how best-
selling author John Grisham depicts attorney advertising in his great 
book The Litigators.  Part III discusses the legal framework of how the 
U.S. Supreme Court protected attorney advertising as a form of 
protected commercial speech.  Part IV addresses how the states and 
bar regulators have treated attorney advertising.  Finally, Part V 
addresses the recent Association of Professional Responsibility 
Lawyers Report and the American Bar Association’s proposed 
6. MIKE SLOCUMB LAW FIRM, http://www.slocumblaw.com/alabama-
hammer-741 (last visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
7. LAW HAWK: BRYAN E. WILSON, ATTORNEY AT LAW, 
http://texaslawhawk.com/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
8. Barchenger, supra note 1.
9. Daniel Fisher, Lawyers Bump Advertising Spending to $890 Million in
Quest for Clients, FORBES (Oct. 27, 2015, 8:21 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/10/27/lawyers-bump-advertising-
spending-to-890-million-in-quest-for-clients/. 
10. David L. Hudson, Jr., NoCuffs, Big Bills: Firm Spends Millions on
Marketing, AM. B. ASS’N J., Jan. 2015, at 33, 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/nocuffs_big_bills. 
11. Victor Li, Legal Advertising Blows Past $1 Billion and Goes Viral, AM. 
B. ASS’N J., Apr. 2017, at 35–36, 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/legal_advertising_viral_video.
12. Sick of Lawsuits, Personal Injury Lawyers Spend More in Advertisements
than Super Bowl Advertisers, SOUTHEAST TEX. REC. (Feb. 11, 2016, 4:56 PM), 
https://setexasrecord.com/stories/510663103-personal-injury-lawyers-spend-more-
in-advertisements-than-super-bowl-advertisers. 
13. Li, supra note 11, at 36.
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changes to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct regarding 
attorney advertising.  Part V briefly concludes. 
II. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING IN THE LITIGATORS
In The Litigators, the great John Grisham depicts a small law 
firm, Finley & Figg, that flouts the rules of professional conduct 
regarding attorney advertising to expand its business.  Finley & Figg 
engaged in a variety of solicitous schemes, a few ethical and many 
others not so much. 
For example, Wallis (“Wally”) Figg impersonated a doctor and 
engaged in the most direct form of face-to-face solicitation, “hovering 
over” a patient in her hospital bed.14  For this form of “blatant 
solicitation,” he received a reprimand from the state bar association.15  
Undeterred, Wally would send flowers and letters to widows.16  He 
drove by funeral homes looking for clients.17  He and his senior 
partner, Oscar Finley (“Finley”), literally scrambled over other lawyers 
to sign up accident victims in the street.18  Finley stopped by a police 
station where his cousin shuffled accident reports.19 
Finley & Figg were “ambulance chasers” in the truest sense of 
the term.20  They even named their dog “AC” after the term.21  Wally 
particularly enjoyed the hustle and bustle of advertising, though 
perhaps because of age they eschewed online advertising.  As the 
irascible office manager Rochelle said, “He advertised so much, in so 
many ways, and in so many odd places that it was impossible to keep 
up with him.”22  He advertised on park benches, high school football 
14. JOHN GRISHAM, THE LITIGATORS 4 (2011).
15. Id. at 75.
16. Id. at 29.
17. Id. at 40–41.
18. Id. at 57.
19. Id. at 12.
20. Ambulance chasing is a long-used term in the legal profession that refers
to attorneys who violate anti-solicitation rules to obtain clients.  Usually, the term 
applies to aggressive personal injury plaintiffs’ attorneys who violate anti-solicitation 
rules.  See Hildebrand v. State Bar of Cal., 225 P.2d 508, 519–20 (Cal. 1950) 
(Traynor, J., concurring) (describing problems of ambulance chasing). 
21. GRISHAM, supra note 14, at 56.
22. Id. at 45.
2018 Attorney Advertising in The Litigators 963 
programs, telephone poles, bingo cards, church bulletins, Rotary Club 
raffles, coupons, and elsewhere.23  The firm even advertised on the side 
of buses.24  Indeed, that was how the unsuspecting big-firm burnout 
David Zinc (“Zinc”) discovered his future colleagues.25  As he 
branched into products liability law, Wally left “Beware of Krayoxx!” 
brochures in restaurant bathrooms.26 
Wally could never convince Finley to go all-in on advertising. 
Wally wanted to advertise via television and billboards, even picking 
out the perfect location, but the less audacious Finley refused.27 
Grisham writes that “a siren from an ambulance always 
quickened [Wally’s] pulse.”28  He describes the “murky world of client 
solicitation.”29  Wally even admitted that he often engaged in “false 
advertising.”30  A key example was Wally introducing the new, young 
Zinc as a “mass tort specialist” when the young attorney had never 
handled a products liability case.31 
Zinc had no illusions that his new bosses were the most ethical 
sort.  He admitted to his wife that “I doubt if they spend much time 
discussing ethics.”32  Zinc, however, realized that Finley & Figg served 
a higher purpose:  they helped real people with real legal problems.33  
He told his frustrated father, a distinguished jurist:  “That’s the beauty 
of street law—you meet the clients face-to-face, you get to know them, 
and, if things work out, you get to help them.”34 
Once he successfully prevailed in a products liability case, Zinc 
had the leverage to force the firm to change names—Finley, Figgs & 
Zinc—and eliminate its advertisements on bus benches, bingo cards, 
and billboards.35  A “Marketing Committee” consisting of only Zinc 
23. Id. at 2–3, 45.
24. Id. at 2.
25. Id. at 53.
26. Id. at 170.
27. Id. at 3.
28. Id. at 18.
29. Id. at 28.
30. Id. at 54.
31. Id. at 85.
32. Id. at 101.
33. Id. at 122.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 380–81.
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wielded veto power over any proposed firm advertisements.36  Wally 
and Finley, however, were burnt out on the practice of law; thus, Zinc 
left the firm after only a year to form his own firm.37 
Many may think that Grisham exaggerated the conduct of the 
fictitious Finley & Figg.  Sadly, lawyers have engaged in similar 
conduct.  For example, an attorney in Ohio entered the hospital rooms 
of a young woman lain up in traction and tried to sign her up as a 
client.38  Another attorney in Kansas obtained a list of people thinking 
of selling their home, mailed them all letters, and offered his services 
as an attorney.39  A New Jersey attorney instructed his office manager 
and runner to contact accident victims on the day of their accident to 
try to procure their business.40  Another New Jersey lawyer sent a 
solicitation letter to the father of an airplane crash victim.41  One 
attorney earned the moniker “the Master of Disaster” because he 
frequented disaster sites around the world to sign up clients.42 
Some of these egregious actions are quite recent.  In late 2016, 
a Texas-based law firm allegedly solicited family members of children 
injured in a bus crash in Chattanooga, Tennessee.43  One of the firm’s 
investigators went to a funeral home only four days after the crash.44  
In December 2017, the Tennessee Attorney General filed a lawsuit 
against the firm.45  Similarly, a lawyer in Florida received 18 months’ 
36. Id. at 381.
37. Id. at 384–85.
38. Ohrahlik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 450 (1978).
39. State v. Moses, 642 P.2d 1004, 1005 (Kan. 1982).
40. In Re Pajerrowski, 721 A.2d 992, 992–94 (N.J. 1998).
41. In Re Anis, 599 A.2d 1265, 1267 (N.J. 1992).
42. Maura Dolan, Fresh on the Heels of Trouble: Ambulance Chasing
Lawyers Are Getting More Aggressive. Some Pay Tipsters or Use Telemarketing. One 
Attorney, the “Master of Disaster,” Flies Around the World to Catasrophes, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 13, 1993), http://articles.latimes.com/1993-10-13/news/mn-
45319_1_ambulance-chasing-lawyers/2. 
43. Attorney General Files Lawsuit Against Predatory Law Firm Targeting
Grieving Families, CHATTANOOGAN (Apr. 26, 2017) [hereinafter Attorney General 
Files Lawsuit], http://www.chattanoogan.com/2017/4/26/346921/Attorney-General-
Files-Lawsuit-Against.aspx.  
44. Zack Peterson, Cashing in on Grief, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS,
(Dec. 18, 2016), http://www.pressreader.com/usa/chattanooga-times-free-
press/20161218/281479276061261. 
45. Attorney General Files Lawsuit, supra note 43.
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probation and 150 hours of community service for improperly 
contacting an accident victim, which is a third-degree felony under a 
Florida statute.46 
Many lawyers have moved to cyberspace with aggressive 
advertising.  “Ambulance chasing is now taking place in cyberspace,” 
writes Bob Buckley.47  “Hungry lawyers . . . are now using the Internet 
to hustle cases.”48  Others have engaged in the seedy world of 
“competitive keyword advertising.”49  Under this process, lawyers 
purchase keyword ads to ensure that their names or firm names pop up 
first when consumers type in certain words.50  In competitive keyword 
advertising, lawyers will buy the name of another lawyer or law firm 
as a keyword, and online searches for the competitor’s name will direct 
Internet users to the purchaser’s domain instead.51 
Many practitioners still view lawyer advertising as a cesspool 
of hyperbolic, self-laudatory, and potentially misleading puffery.52  
Others claim that some attorney ads, particularly those seeking 
prospective clients in suits against drug manufacturers, may even be 
harmful.53  One commentator says that they “invoke fear and emotional 
paralysis in some patients.”54  Grisham appears to support this point of 
46. Gary Blankenship, Unlawful Solicitation Is Taken Very Seriously: Board
Panel Is Considering Even Stronger Methods of Enforcement, FLA. B. NEWS, May 1, 
2016, at 1. 
47. Bob Buckley, Lawyers Hustling Work Online a New Low, THE EXAMINER,
Dec. 7, 2011, at B7. 
48. Id.
49. See generally Eric Goldman & Angel Reyes III, Regulation of Lawyers’
Use of Competitive Keyword Advertising, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 103 (2016). 
50. David L. Hudson, Jr., Texas Lawyers May Use Competitors’ Names in
Keyword Marketing, AM. B. ASS’N J. (Nov. 2016), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/search_engine_marketing_legal_ethics
. 
51. Id.
52. Ralph H. Brock, “This Court Took a Wrong Turn with Bates”: Why the
Supreme Court Should Revisit Lawyer Advertising, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 145, 198 
(2009); M.H. Gertler, Lawyer Advertising Point: Enough Is Enough, 64 LA. BAR J. 
110, 110–13 (2016). 
53. Daniel M. Schaffzin, Warning: Lawyer Advertising May Be Hazardous to
Your Health! A Call to Fairly Balance Solicitation of Clients in Pharmaceutical 
Litigation, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 319, 325 (2013). 
54. Melissa Landry, Often Misleading and Sometimes Dangerous, Lawyer Ads
Should be Regulated, THE DONALDSONVILLE CHIEF, Mar. 2, 2017, at A4. 
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view in The Litigators, using Figg & Finley as a caricature of the 
lawyers who are ambulance chasers.  This view has some merit.  It is 
undeniable that some lawyers cross the line with their excessive 
solicitations and distasteful ads.  Attorney advertisers, however, have 
a valuable ally on their side:  the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  Attorney advertising also serves a purpose of the highest 
order:  informing consumers of their legal rights. 
III. SUPREME COURT’S DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH
DOCTRINE AND PROTECTION FOR ATTORNEY ADVERTISING
The United States Supreme Court has recognized both the need 
to regulate attorney advertising and its role in helping consumers learn 
about legal assistance.55  Originally, commercial speech received no 
free-speech protection at all.  In 1942, for example, the U.S. Supreme 
Court rejected the free-speech claims of an industrious entrepreneur 
named F.J. Chrestensen who sought to advertise his World War I 
submarine through handbills he distributed on New York City streets.  
City officials informed Chrestensen that his activities violated the 
Sanitary Code, which prohibited commercial handbills.56  The 
resourceful Chrestensen then printed double-sided handbills, detailing 
his dispute with city officials on one side and his commercial speech 
on the other side.57 
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected Chrestensen’s attempts at 
injecting political speech into his leaflets, declaring “[w]e are equally 
clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as 
respects purely commercial advertising.”58  The Court “plucked the 
commercial speech doctrine out of thin air.”59  If the Supreme Court 
granted First Amendment protection to any form of advertisement, 
such as the famous editorial advertising “Heed Their Rising Voices” 
55. See generally Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
56. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 53 (1942) (referencing N.Y.C.
Sanitary Code § 318). 
57. Id. at 52–53.
58. Id. at 54.
59. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76
VA. L. REV. 627, 627 (1990). 
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in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court justified it by stating that 
the ad did more than propose a commercial transaction.60 
In the mid-1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
commercial speech was entitled to First Amendment protection.  The 
seminal case was Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.61  The case examined a Virginia law 
prohibiting pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices; 
Virginia asserted that allowing such advertisements would demean the 
professionalism of the pharmacy profession.62  In striking down the 
statute as a violation of the First Amendment, Justice Harry Blackmun, 
writing for the majority, stressed the importance of the information to 
consumers:  “When drug prices vary as strikingly as they do, 
information as to who is charging what becomes more than a 
convenience.  It could mean the alleviation of physical pain or the 
enjoyment of basic necessities.”63 
Justice Blackmun also emphasized society’s strong interest in 
the “free flow of commercial information”64 and that such a free flow 
was “indispensable” in a market economy based on private choices.65  
The high professional standards and regulations of the pharmacist 
profession addressed the state’s concerns with professionalism.66  
Justice Blackmun then authored a time-honored passage in response to 
the idea that the Commonwealth of Virginia was simply acting in the 
best interests by protecting its citizens.  He wrote: 
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly 
paternalistic approach.  That alternative is to assume that 
this information is not in itself harmful, that people will 
perceive their own best interests if only they are well 
60. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)
(“The publication here was not a ‘commercial’ advertisement in the sense in which 
the word was used in Chrestensen.  It communicated information, expressed opinion, 
recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf 
of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public 
interest and concern.”). 
61. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
62. Id. at 766.
63. Id. at 763–64.
64. Id. at 764.
65. Id. at 765.
66. Id. at 768.
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enough informed, and that the best means to that end is 
to open the channels of communication rather than to 
close them.  If they are truly open, nothing prevents the 
“professional” pharmacist from marketing his own 
assertedly superior product, and contrasting it with that 
of the low-cost, high-volume prescription drug retailer. 
But the choice among these alternative approaches is not 
ours to make or the Virginia General Assembly’s.  It is 
precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of 
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if 
it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for 
us.67 
According to Justice Blackmun, however, “some forms of commercial 
speech regulation are surely permissible.”68  These included 
regulations governing “[u]ntruthful,” “misleading,” and “deceptive” 
commercial speech.69 
A. Extending Commercial Speech Protection to Attorney
Advertising: Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 
Virginia Pharmacy paved the way for the seminal lawyer 
advertising decision, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.70  John R. Bates 
and Van O’Steen graduated from Arizona State University College of 
Law in 1972.71  They started working at Maricopa County Legal Aid 
Society after graduation, providing various legal services to those who 
could not afford legal services.72  After two years, they left legal aid 
and formed a small law firm, which they called a “legal clinic,” in 
downtown Phoenix in 1974.73  They soon realized they did not have 
enough clients to keep the doors open.74  They turned to advertising 
67. Id. at 770.
68. Id. at 770.
69. Id. at 771.
70. 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977).
71. Van O’Steen, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona: The Personal Account of a
Party and the Consumer Benefits of Lawyer Advertising, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 245, 246 
(2005). 
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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even though the state bar rules prohibited such advertising.75  The 
applicable rule provided: 
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or 
associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his 
firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine 
advertisements, radio or television announcements, 
display advertisements in the city or telephone 
directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor 
shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his 
behalf.76 
Bates and O’Steen submitted the ad to The Arizona Republic, 
advertising prices for routine legal services.77  The State Bar of 
Arizona served them with a complaint for violating the advertising 
rule.78  The Committee of the State Bar recommended a six-month 
suspension.79  The Board of Governors of the State Bar reduced the 
suspension to one week.80  Bates and O’Steen appealed to the Arizona 
Supreme Court, which affirmed the punishment but reduced it to 
censures.81 
The U.S. Supreme Court narrowly reversed on the First 
Amendment issue by a 5-4 vote.82  The Court addressed numerous 
arguments that the State advanced, including that advertising would 
have an adverse impact on professionalism,83 that attorney advertising 
is inherently misleading,84 that it will have an adverse impact on the 
administration of justice,85 that it will have harmful economic 
75. Id. at 246–47.
76. Id. at 248 n.6.
77. Id. at 247.
78. Id. at 248.
79. Id. at 249.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
83. Id. at 368–72.
84. Id. at 372–75.
85. Id. at 375–77.
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impacts,86 that it will have an adverse impact on the quality of legal 
services,87 and that it will be too difficult to enforce.88 
Regarding professionalism, Justice Blackmun questioned 
whether advertising would cause the legal profession to look 
undignified.89  He noted that other professions, such as bankers and 
engineers, advertise without a loss of dignity.90  He also pointed out 
that the ban against advertising arose as a “rule of etiquette,” not 
ethics.91 
Justice Blackmun rejected the idea that attorney advertising is 
inherently misleading.  O’Steen and Bates simply advertised their 
prices for such routine legal services as uncontested divorces, simple 
adoptions, uncontested personal bankruptcies, and name changes.92  
Regarding adverse impacts, Justice Blackmun refuted the idea that 
advertising would cause negative harms.  “But advertising by attorneys 
is not an unmitigated source of harm to the administration of justice,” 
he wrote.93  “It may offer great benefits.”94  Advertising would inform 
the public about choices of counsel and the availability of legal 
services,95 particularly to the populace priced out of the legal market.96 
Justice Blackmun next addressed the argument that advertising 
would drive up legal costs.  He questioned this argument, noting that 
the advertising ban “serves to perpetuate the market position of 
established attorneys.”97  Advertising is helpful for new attorneys to 
penetrate the market.98  With respect to quality of legal services, Justice 
Blackmun wrote that advertising might actually help legal clinics, such 
as that set up by Bates and O’Steen, to perform better legal work.99 
86. Id. at 377–78.
87. Id. at 378–79.
88. Id. at 379.
89. Id. at 368–69.
90. Id. at 369–70.
91. Id. at 371.
92. Id. at 372.
93. Id. at 376.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 376–77.
96. Id. at 377.
97. Id. at 378.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 378–79.
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Finally, Justice Blackmun did not think much of the argument 
that it would be too difficult to enforce whether attorneys crossed the 
line and engaged in false and misleading advertising.  “For every 
attorney who overreaches through advertising, there will be thousands 
of others who will be candid and honest and straightforward.”100  
Justice Blackmun concluded:  “In sum, we are not persuaded that any 
of the proffered justifications rise to the level of an acceptable reason 
for the suppression of all advertising by attorneys.”101 
The Bates decision “altered, in a profound way, the legal 
profession and the legal services marketplace.”102  The case “led to a 
virtual explosion” in attorney advertising.103  Judge William Canby, 
who represented his former students successfully in Bates, told me 
years ago: “The case stands for the idea that commercial information 
is something that offers vitally important information to consumers 
just as other types of speech, and the speech is important because it 
leads to economic decisions that govern our lives. . . . Abraham 
Lincoln advertised his services when he practiced law.”104 
While the Court protected Bates’ and O’Steen’s ad, the Court 
wrote that it might be a different story with regard to “in-person 
solicitation.”105 
B. Direct, Face-to-Face Solicitation Treated Differently
Recall that in Bates, the Supreme Court said that direct 
solicitation might be treated much differently than the truthful 
newspaper ad of John Bates and Van O’Steen.106  The Court addressed 
that question the very next year in the case of Ohralik v. Ohio State 
Bar Association.107  Cleveland-based attorney Albert Ohrahlik may 
100. Id. at 379.
101. Id.
102. O’Steen, supra note 71, at 245.
103. David L. Hudson, Jr., Bates Participants Reflect on Landmark Case,
NEWSEUM INSTITUTE (Nov. 18, 2004), 
http://www.newseuminstitute.org/2004/11/18/bates-participants-reflect-on-
landmark-case/. 
104. Id.
105. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384.
106. Id. at 366.
107. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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have been part of the inspiration for Grisham’s memorable character, 
Wally Figg.  Ohralik learned from the postmaster’s brother that two 
young women were injured in an automobile accident.108  He visited 
one of the young women’s parents, who said that the decision of 
whether to hire him as the attorney would be up to their daughter.109  
Ohralik then proceeded to the hospital where he saw 18-year-old Carol 
McClintock lain up in traction in her hospital room.110  She did not sign 
an attorney retainer agreement that day but did two days later while 
still in her hospital room.111 
Ohralik also visited the home of the other young woman in the 
car, Wanda Holbert, and tried to sign her up as a client.112  He secretly 
tape-recorded the conversation with Ms. Holbert.113  Ms. Holbert 
orally agreed to let Ohralik represented her.114  The next day, Ms. 
Holbert’s mother called Ohralik, saying she did not want to sue and 
that her daughter was withdrawing the representation.115  Ohralik said 
that there was a binding contract.116 
Both young women discharged Ohralik as their attorney and 
filed bar complaints against him.117  The state disciplinary board 
brought charges against Ohralik for improper solicitation and rejected 
Ohralik’s First Amendment-based defense.118  The Supreme Court of 
Ohio adopted the Board’s findings but increased the punishment from 
the recommended public reprimand to an indefinite suspension.119 
Ohralik appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
unanimously affirmed and ruled against the hospital-visiting 
attorney.120  Ohralik argued that, just as Bates and O’Steen informed 
potential clients about their legal rights, he did so as well with his in-
108. Id. at 449.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 450.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 451.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 451.
115. Id. at 451–52.
116. Id. at 452.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 452–53.
119. Id. at 453–54.
120. Id. at 454.
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home and hospital visits.121  The Court rejected the analogy, reasoning 
that in-person solicitation was not entitled to the same degree of respect 
and protection as truthful advertising of routine legal services.122  The 
Court explained that “in-person solicitation may exert pressure and 
often demands an immediate response, without providing an 
opportunity for comparison or reflection.”123 
The Court also emphasized the roles of attorneys as “officers of 
the courts”124—an appellation that Zinc accepted more readily than 
Wally or Finley.125  The Court stressed that protecting the public from 
improper solicitation was a “legitimate and important state interest.”126  
Ohralik’s conduct was “inherently conducive to overreaching.”127  The 
Court concluded, “[t]he facts in this case present a striking example of 
the potential for overreaching that is inherent in a lawyer’s in-person 
solicitation of professional employment.”128 
C. High Court Pattern of Protecting Attorney Advertising
After Ohralik, the Court began consistently protecting attorney 
advertisers in a series of cases.129  On the same day the Court decided 
Ohralik, the Court protected an ACLU attorney in South Carolina who 
sought to obtain litigants to challenge an Aiken, South Carolina, policy 
of conditioning the receipt of Medicaid benefits upon sterilization.130  
The Court distinguished the conduct of Edna Smith Primus, the ACLU 
attorney, from Albert Ohralik because Primus was not engaged in “in-
person solicitation for pecuniary gain.”131 
121. Id. at 455.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 457.
124. Id. at 460 (citing Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)).
125. See GRISHAM, supra note 14, at 380–81 (setting the ground rules for the
proposed Finley, Figg & Zinc firm). 
126. Ohralik, 463 U.S. at 462.
127. Id. at 464.
128. Id. at 468.
129. See generally DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM
OF SPEECH § 6:4 (2013). 
130. See generally In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
131. Id. at 422.
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The Court later struck down several Missouri restrictions on 
attorney advertising in In Re R.M.J.,132 including a prohibition on 
advertising oneself as a “real estate” lawyer,133 a restriction prohibiting 
an attorney from advertising that he was licensed in different states,134 
and a prohibition on sending general announcement cards about an 
attorney’s new solo practice.135 
In the next case, the Court ruled that the Ohio Bar Association 
could not discipline an attorney for advertising that he was willing to 
represent women injured by a contraceptive device.136  In that decision, 
the Court struck down a prohibition on illustrations in attorney ads.137  
The Court explained that the illustration of the contraceptive device 
was not misleading.138  The Court explained that a state could require 
attorneys to include disclaimers in some ads to reduce the possibility 
of potentially misleading speech.139  The Court explained, “an 
advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure 
requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing 
deception of consumers.”140 
Then, in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association,141 the Court 
struck down a general ban on attorney solicitation letters.  The Court 
explained “the First Amendment does not permit a ban on certain 
speech merely because it is more efficient; the State may not 
constitutionally ban a particular letter on the theory that to mail it only 
to those whom it would most interest is somehow inherently 
objectionable.”142  A few years later, the Court once again protected an 
132. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
133. Id. at 205.
134. Id. at 205–06.
135. Id. at 206.
136. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 655–66 (1985). 
137. Id. at 647–49.
138. Id. at 639–41.
139. Id. at 651 (quoting In Re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 201).
140. Id.
141. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
142. Id. at 473–74.
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attorney advertiser who advertised that he was a specialist certified by 
the National Board of Trial Advocacy.143 
D. The Retrenchment
From In Primus through Peel, the Court consistently protected 
attorney advertising from regulation.  In 1995, however, the Court 
sharply broke from this practice in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,144 
narrowly upholding a Florida Bar rule prohibiting solicitation letters 
until 30 days after an accident.  Florida attorney G. Stewart McHenry 
and his lawyer referral service, Went For It, Inc., challenged the 30-
day ban on solicitation letters as a direct infringement of First 
Amendment free-speech rights.145  McHenry lost his law license for 
acts of sexual misconduct.146  Went For It, Inc., however, continued as 
a named plaintiff.147  The Florida Bar countered that the rule was 
necessary to protect the privacy rights of accident families and their 
families and the reputation of the Bar.148  The Bar relied on a two-year, 
106-page study that contained both anecdotal and statistical evidence
that many members of the public viewed attorney solicitations as
intrusive.149  The Court applied the test for evaluating restrictions on
commercial speech that it developed in the non-attorney advertising
decision Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n
of New York.150  Under the Central Hudson test, government officials
can freely regulate speech that is false or misleading.151  If the speech
is truthful and non-misleading, however, the government must show
that it has a substantial interest in its regulation, that its regulation
143. Peel v. Att’y Registration & Disciplinary Comm. of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 93,
110–11 (1990). 
144. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
145. Id. at 621.
146. Fla. Bar v. McHenry, 605 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1992).  McHenry allegedly
touched a personal-injury client all over her body during a client consultation.  Id. at 
460. He claimed it was to determine the extent of her injuries.  Id.  Allegedly, he then
went and masturbated at his desk.  Id.  Additionally, a second client complained that
McHenry masturbated while she was in his office.  Id. at 460–61.
147. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 621.
148. Id. at 625.
149. Id. at 626.
150. Id. at 623–28 (citing 447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
151. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
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directly and materially advances its substantial interest and is narrowly 
tailored.152 
In Went For It, the Court assumed that the letters were neither 
false nor misleading.153  The Court then accepted the Bar’s stated 
interests in privacy and the reputation of the Bar as substantial.154  
More controversially, the Court also found that the 30-day ban on 
solicitation letters directly and materially advanced these interests in a 
narrowly tailored way.155  The Court relied on the 106-page anecdotal 
and statistical study, noting that it was “noteworthy for its breadth and 
detail.”156  The study included letters from individuals, irate and upset 
at receiving lawyer communications after the death of a loved one.157 
The idea that the 30-day rule directly and materially advanced 
privacy and reputational interests in a narrowly tailored way was 
problematic.  In dissent, Justice Anthony Kennedy criticized the 
majority for reducing First Amendment protections for those most in 
need of information about legal services.158  Besides pointing out that 
individuals in accidents often are in urgent need for legal assistance, 
he reasoned that no such time limitation operated to restrict the 
activities of insurance adjusters.159  Justice Kennedy explained, “direct 
solicitation may serve vital purposes and promote the administration 
of justice.”160  He wrote that the Florida Bar was “manipulating the 
public’s opinion by suppressing speech that informs us how the legal 
system works.”161 
The great irony of the Court’s Went For It decision is that, at 
about the same time that the Court decreased First Amendment 
152. Id. at 565–66.
153. 515 U.S. at 624 (noting that government officials can regulate false or
misleading speech but proceeding to examine the remaining prongs of the Central 
Hudson test, thus seemingly assuming the letters were neither false or misleading). 
154. Id. at 625.
155. Id. at 626–28.
156. Id. at 627.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 635 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Court today undercuts this
guarantee in an important class of cases and unsettles leading First Amendment 
precedents, at the expense of those victims most in need of legal assistance.”). 
159. Id. at 636.
160. Id. at 639.
161. Id. at 639–40.
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protection for attorney advertisers, the Court was strengthening 
protection for other commercial advertisers.162  Indeed, from the mid-
1990s, the Court has increased protection for other advertisers, 
including liquor advertisers,163 gambling advertisers,164 and tobacco 
advertisers.165  Attorney advertisers, however, remained strangely left 
behind–at least in some jurisdictions.  First Amendment expert Rod 
Smolla explained this phenomenon in poignant language:  “If 
commercial advertisers are First Amendment step-children, lawyers 
come closer to abandoned orphans.”166 
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON ATTORNEY ADVERTISERS IN THE STATES
At least some states certainly appear to treat attorney advertisers 
like “abandoned orphans.”167  These states impose a variety of 
restrictions on attorney advertisers.  Some of the restrictions involve 
state rules of professional conduct that provide an exhaustive list of 
what constitutes “false and misleading” communications to clients. 
For example, South Dakota lists 17 examples of “false and 
misleading” communications.168  These include limitations on 
comparisons with other lawyers, testimonials, dramatizations, and the 
catch-all category of “any other material statement or claim that cannot 
162. As one astute legal commentator points out, three of the dissenters in
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. were Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Stevens.  See 
Melissa K. Feliciano, THE MARYLAND SURVEY: 1996-1997: Recent Decisions: 
The Maryland Court of Appeals, 57 MD. L. REV. 659, 671 (1997).  They joined the 
plurality opinion in a case the next year, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 
U.S. 484 (1996), that provided greater protection for commercial speech.  See 
Feliciano, supra, at 669; see also David L. Hudson, Jr., Attorney Ads, NEWSEUM
INSTITUTE  (Dec. 2008), http://www.newseuminstitute.org/first-amendment-
center/topics/freedom-of-speech-2/advertising-first-amendment-overview/attorney-
ads/  (“Ironically, the Went For It decision and other regulations on attorney speech 
have occurred during a time when the U.S. Supreme Court has more searchingly 
scrutinized restrictions on commercial speech in general.”). 
163. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. 484.
164. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173
(1999). 
165. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
166. Rodney M. Smolla, The Puffery of Lawyers, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 4
(2002). 
167. Id.
168. S.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1(c).
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be factually substantiated.”169  Florida prohibits attorney ads that are 
“unduly manipulative or intrusive.”170  Arkansas flatly prohibits 
lawyers from using testimonials or endorsements as ads.171  Ohio 
prohibits lawyers from advertising legal fees with the terms “cut-rate,” 
“lowest,” “give-away,” “low-cost,” or “special.”172  North Carolina has 
extensive disclaimer requirements for dramatizations.173  Colorado 
requires lawyers to use only regular U.S. mail when sending 
unsolicited communications to persons.174  Alabama has a special rule 
on the professional cards of non-lawyers.175 
Some state court decisions regarding attorney advertising are 
hard to justify.  For example, in N.C. State Bar v. Culbertson, the Court 
of Appeals of North Carolina admonished a lawyer for including on 
his letterhead and on his website that he was “Published in Federal 
Reports, 3d Series.”176  The attorney indeed was an attorney of record 
in a federal case that was printed in the Federal Reporter.177  This was 
truthful information.  However, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina 
reasoned that “[a] member of the general public could easily be led to 
believe from defendant’s assertions on his firm letterhead and website 
that he authored the opinion contained in the Federal Reporter.”178  The 
decision relies on a very paternalistic assumption about the lack of 
knowledge of the general public.  The result in Culbertson borders on 
the absurd.  The Florida Supreme Court approved of the imposition of 
public discipline upon attorneys who advertised themselves with a 
“pitbull” logo and used as their phone number “1-800-PITBULL.”179  
The Court wrote that the attorneys had used a “sensationalistic image 
and a slogan.”180  The Court explained: 
169. S.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1(c)(5), (14)–(15), (17).
170. FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.
171. ARK. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1(d).
172. OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1, cmt. 4.
173. N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1(b).
174. COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1(c).
175. ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.6.
176. 627 S.E.2d 644, 646 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
177. Id. at 649.
178. Id.
179. Fla. Bar v. Pape, 918 So. 2d 240, 241–42 (Fla. 2005).
180. Id. at 243.
2018 Attorney Advertising in The Litigators 979 
The logo of the pit bull wearing a spiked collar and the 
prominent display of the phone number 1-800-PIT-
BULL are more manipulative and misleading than a 
drawing of a fist.  These advertising devices would 
suggest to many persons not only that the lawyers can 
achieve results but also that they engage in a combative 
style of advocacy.  The suggestion is inherently 
deceptive because there is no way to measure whether 
the attorneys in fact conduct themselves like pit bulls so 
as to ascertain whether this logo and phone number 
convey accurate information.181 
The Court went so far as to write that “permitting this type of 
advertisement would make a mockery of our dedication to promoting 
public trust and confidence in our system of justice.”182 
The attorneys filed a petition for Supreme Court review, 
arguing that the ban on the pitbull advertising violated the First 
Amendment because it was demeaning and created an “amorphous and 
standardless judgment.”183  The petition stated that, “under our First 
Amendment principles, even when discounted by the reduced 
standards applicable to commercial speech, we assign the management 
of good taste to the forces of the marketplace, not the forces of 
government.”184  The High Court, however, denied review.185 
In a disturbing trend, more and more states have engaged in 
“greater micromanagement of on-line advertising.”186  For example, 
the New York County Lawyers Association Professional Ethics 
Committee issued an opinion that warned lawyers about making false 
181. Id. at 244.
182. Id. at 246.
183. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Pape v. Fla. Bar, 918 So. 2d 240 (Fla.
2005) (No. 05-1046). 
184. Id. at 5.
185. Pape, 918 So. 2d at 240, cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1632 (2006).
186. ASS’N OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY LAWYERS, 2015 REPORT OF THE 
REGULATION OF LAWYER ADVERTISING COMMITTEE 22 (2015) [hereinafter APRL 
REPORT], 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsi
bility/aprl_june_22_2015%20report.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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or misleading statements on their LinkedIn profiles, even those 
submitted by other endorsers or reviewers.187 
The Virginia Supreme Court ruled that a lawyer’s blog about 
his cases could be subject to the state’s advertising rules.  The criminal 
defense attorney blogged about many of his cases, including the results 
he achieved.188  Even though his blogs contained political commentary, 
the Virginia high court determined that the lawyer’s blog was a form 
of commercial speech subject to the advertising rules.189  “Hunter has 
admitted that his motivation for the blog is at least in part economic,” 
the court found.190  “The posts are an advertisement in that they 
predominately describe cases where he has received a favorable result 
for his client.”191 
In dissent, Judge Donald Lemon recognized that speech about 
the criminal justice system is political speech:  “Speech concerning the 
criminal justice system has always been viewed as political speech.”192  
He also pointed out that “[m]arketing is not Hunter’s sole motivation 
for maintaining this blog.  As discussed above, one of Hunter’s 
motivations in maintaining the blog is to disseminate information 
about ‘the criminal justice system, the criminal trials and the manner 
in which the government prosecutes its citizens.’”193 
First Amendment expert Clay Calvert said, “[t]he decision 
could have a chilling effect on the speech of some of the most informed 
people in the United States when it comes to problems with the 
criminal justice system—namely, the attorneys who deal with it on a 
daily basis.”194  The attorney petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, 
contending that “[s]peech concerning the judicial system is 
187. See generally N.Y.C. Lawyers Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Formal Op.
748 (2015), http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/connected%20lawyer%20opinion.pdf. 
188. Hunter v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Third Dist. Comm., 744 S.E.2d 611, 613
(Va. 2013). 
189. Id. at 617.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 622 (Lemons, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 623.
194. David L. Hudson, Jr., Virginia Supreme Court Holds That Advertising
Rules May Be Applied to a Lawyer’s Blog, AM. B. ASS’N J. (Nov. 2013), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/virginia_supreme_court_holds_that_ad
vertising_rules_may_be_applied_to_a_law. 
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quintessentially ‘political speech’ falling squarely within the ambit of 
the marketplace of ideas.”195  The U.S. Supreme Court denied review, 
failing to provide needed guidance on when an attorney’s blog may be 
considered commercial speech by bar regulators.196 
A. A New Age for Attorney Advertisers?
There is a greater recognition in the last couple of years, at least 
in certain quarters, that lawyers need more freedom in advertising and 
that the current advertising restrictions are outdated.  In 2015, the 
Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers’ Regulation of 
Lawyer Advertising Committee issued a report that called for a 
comprehensive overhaul of the current rules.197 
The APRL Report stated that the rules in most jurisdictions are 
“outdated and unworkable in the current legal environment and fail to 
achieve their stated objectives.”198  Many of the current rules are based 
on lawyer ads in print and other traditional forms of advertising, such 
as business cards or mailers.199  These rules are becoming increasingly 
outdated, as more and more lawyers are advertising on social media.200  
The APRL Report gave the informative example of a lawyer not being 
able to use Twitter in Florida because the lawyer would not have 
sufficient space to include a required disclaimer.201  The trend of over-
regulating attorney speech on the Internet is disturbing, because 
Internet-based advertising is “accepted practice” and the most common 
195. Hunter, 744 S.E.2d at 695.
196. Hunter, 744 S.E.2d at 611, cert. denied, 570 U.S. 919 (2013).
197. See generally APRL REPORT, supra note 186.
198. Id. at 3.
199. Id. at 20 (“State rules on lawyer advertising are largely based on print and
other forms of traditional advertising such as announcements, business cards, mailers, 
newsletters, yellow pages, billboards, television and radio ads, newspaper 
advertisements, and listings in Martindale Hubbell or other print directories.”). 
200. See generally ATTORNEY AT WORK, 2017 SOCIAL MEDIA MARKETING
SURVEY REPORT (2017), https://www.attorneyatwork.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/2017-Social-Media-Marketing-Survey-Report-@-
AttorneyatWork.pdf. 
201. See APRL REPORT, supra note 186, at 21 (quoting David L. Hudson, Jr.,
Firm Challenges Florida Bar Over Website Ad Limits, ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 2015), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/firm_challenges_florida_bar_over_we
bsite_ad_limits/). 
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way that the public receives and tries to discover legal information and 
legal services.202 
“The APRL report acknowledges what all of us know—that, 
with the growth of technology, American consumers now have access 
to a vast potpourri of information about lawyers,” committee member 
Bruce E.H. Johnson told the ABA Journal.203  “As a consequence, 
many old-fashioned restrictions governing the dissemination of 
information about legal services have become outmoded and, to the 
extent that they inhibit information that is neither false nor misleading, 
potentially dangerous to free speech rights.”204  The Committee did not 
call for an abdication of regulators’ authority over legal advertising.205  
Instead, the Committee explained that it advocated that the states 
create a “single rule” against lawyers engaging in “false or misleading 
advertising.”206 
The basis behind the APRL Report is the idea that rules 
governing attorney ads should not hamper attorneys’ ability to 
communicate truthful information to would-be legal consumers.  The 
APRL Report explains that “[r]estrictions on accurate information 
about legal service, imposed by competing law firms that function as 
part of the regulatory governing body, restrain trade and hinders the 
public’s access to useful information.”207  The effect of some of these 
overly broad advertising restrictions is that it chills attorneys from 
communicating to members of the public in the way that most 
members of the public generally communicate.208 
202. Mark L. Tuft, Rethinking Lawyer Advertising Rules, 23 THE 
PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 1, 1 (2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/professional_lawyer/vol
ume_23_number_3/ABA_PLN_v023n03_01_rethinking_lawyer_advertising_rules.
authcheckdam.pdf. 
203. David L. Hudson, Jr., Drastic Change Needed in “Outdated and
Unworkable” Lawyer Advertising Rules, Says Report, AM. B. ASS’N J. (Oct. 2015) 
[hereinafter Hudson, Drastic Change], 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/all_aboard_for_streamlining. 
204. Id.
205. APRL REPORT, supra note 186, at 4.
206. Id. at 3.
207. Id. at 26.
208. Id. at 27; see also Ronald G. Rotunda, Regulating Attorney Advertising
When It Is Not Misleading, VERDICT JUSTIA (Oct. 12, 2015), 
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The APRL Report also revealed some other illuminating 
findings, including that complaints about advertising are rare, that 
those who complain about lawyer advertisements are usually other 
lawyers, few states actively monitor lawyer ads, and much disciplined 
conduct could have been disciplinable under the catch-all rule 
8.4(c).209  The APRL Report concludes that “[a] simple ‘false or 
misleading’ standard for lawyer communications about legal services 
best balances the important interests of access to justice, protection of 
the public and clients, integrity of the legal profession, and the uniform 
regulation of lawyer conduct.”210  This proposal, according to the 
APRL Report, is “the best way to ensure honest communication by 
lawyers while at the same time promoting the widest possible access 
by the public to legal services.”211 
“Our empirical study showed that the problem is not how the 
lawyer designates himself or herself as an admiralty lawyer, or whether 
the lawyer uses email or text messages,” ethics and constitutional law 
expert Ronald Rotunda, who served on the committee that drafted the 
APRL Report, told the ABA Journal.212  “To the extent there is any 
problem, it has to do with misleading speech.  If the disciplinary 
authorities focused their limited resources in that area, clients would 
be better off.”213 
The APRL Report calls for a “common sense response” to 
regulating lawyer ads.214  It says that lawyer ad rules should be uniform 
rather than a hodge-podge of different state rules.215  Further, it states 
that “[l]awyers should not be subject to discipline for ‘potentially 
misleading’ advertisements or advertisements that a regulator thinks 
are distasteful or unprofessional.”216 
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/10/12/regulating-lawyer-advertising-when-it-is-not-
misleading. 
209. APRL REPORT, supra note 186, at 28.
210. Id. at 30.
211. Id. at 32.
212. Hudson, Drastic Change, supra note 203.
213. Id.
214. APRL REPORT, supra note 186, at 4.
215. Id. at 29.
216. Id.
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B. Latest ABA Draft Proposal of Rule 7
The ABA responded to the APRL Report by proposing changes 
to Model Rule 7 that incorporate at least one major theme of the 
report—focusing, as the primary area of emphasis, on the “false and 
misleading” prohibition of Rule 7.1.217  Under the new draft version of 
Rule 7, the currently published Rule 7.5, Firm Names and Letterheads, 
is deleted.218  Much of what was Model Rule 7.5 becomes Comments 
4 through 8 of Model Rule 7.1, the main rule against “false or 
misleading” communications.219 
Model Rule 7.3, Solicitation of Clients, is modified to allow 
lawyers to solicit not only other lawyers, family members, or close 
friends, but also “a person who is known by the lawyer to be an 
experienced user of the type of legal services involved for business 
matters.”220  Proposed Comment 2 to Rule 7.3 reflects a recognition of 
new technologies in lawyer advertising by defining “live person to 
person contact” to mean “in person, face to face, telephone, and real-
time person to person communications such as Skype or Facetime, and 
other visual/auditory communications where the prospective client 
may feel obligated to speak with the lawyer.”221 
The net effect is that the APRL Report and, at least to some 
degree, the proposed changes to ABA Model Rule 7 reflect a need to 
update the rules from a technological standpoint.  Hopefully, when 
state regulators of attorney advertisers police the bar for allegedly false 
and misleading communications, they remember the value of attorney 
advertising to the public. 
V. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that many attorney ads exhibit questionable 
taste.  Some are downright offensive, silly, or strange.  The image of 
217. Id. at 4.
218. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7 (AM. BAR ASS’N, Working
Draft December 21, 2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsi
bility/scepr_advertising_rules_draft_12_21_17.authcheckdam.pdf. 
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id.
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the ambulance-chasing lawyer that John Grisham depicted so 
humorously in The Litigators is not likely to go away anytime soon. 
The Wally Figgs of the world will continue to cross ethical boundaries 
in pursuit of clients, though they probably will do so in more 
technologically advanced ways.  While Wally did not advertise online, 
he certainly tried just about everything else.  Grisham captured the 
essence of the overzealous lawyer acting more as a huckster than as a 
learned professional.222 
What should never be forgotten, however, is that lawyer 
advertising serves a high purpose:  to inform consumers or prospective 
clients of their legal rights.  Furthermore, the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution protects most lawyer advertising.  In a free-
market economy in a society devoted to the marketplace of ideas, it 
makes little sense to stem the free flow of commercial information—
even if it involves tasteless or offensive speech.  The APRL Report 
recognizes the benefits of attorney advertising and hopefully will lead 
to a better system—one in which the morality police do not sanction 
lawyers for offensive or tasteless speech but focus on ads that are truly 
false or misleading. 
222. See generally GRISHAM, supra note 14.
